Draney v. Draney : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2009
Draney v. Draney : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
N. Adam Caldwell; Lewis P. Reece; Snow Jensen & Reece; Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellee.
Stephen K. Harris; Matthew Harris; Harris & Harris Lawyers, LLC; Attorneys for Respondent/
Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Draney v. Draney, No. 20090111 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2009).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/1506
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JEANINE PORTER DRANEY, 
Petitioner and 
Appellee, 
vs. 
TERRYL KEVIN DRANEY, 
Respondent and 
Appellant 
* 
* 
BRIEF OF THE 
APPELLANT/RESPONDENT TERRYL 
KEVIN DRANEY 
Appellate Ct. No. 
District Ct. No. 
20090111 
064500942 
APPEAL FROM THE JANUARY 2ND, 2009, FINDINGS; ORDER RE: PENDING 
MOTIONS; AND JUDGMENT OF THE 
THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT, WASHINGTON COUNTY, 
THE HONORABLE JAMES L. SHUMATE 
N. Adam Caldwell 
Lewis P. Reece 
SNOW JENSEN & REECE 
912 West 1600 South, Suite 200 
St. George, UT 84770 
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellee 
Stephen K. Harris 
Matthew L. Harris 
HARRIS & HARRIS LAWYERS, LLC 
52 South 850 West, Suite 202 
Hurricane, Utah 84737 
Attorneys for Respondent/Appellant 
Page 1 of 24 
-TAH APPELLATE COURTS 
NAY ? 1 21 
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED DECISION REQUESTED 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 3 
STATEMENT OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION 5 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 5 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. OR RULES 7 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 7 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 9 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 11 
ARGUMENT 13 
I. IT WAS A VIOLATION OF THE OPEN COURTS PROVISION AND THE 
DUE PROCESS PROVISION OF THE UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION TO 
RENDER JUDGMENT AGAINST THE RESPONDENT AT TRIAL, 
WITHOUT ALLOWING THE RESPONDENT AN OPPORTUNITY TO 
PRESENT HIS CASE AND HIS DEFENSES 13 
II. IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO 
ENTER JUDGMENT AGAINST THE RESPONDENT BECAUSE 
RESPONDENT'S ATTORNEY FAILED TO APPEAR IN THE 
COURTROOM FOR TRIAL 16 
III. IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO 
SUA SPONTE AWARD ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS TO THE 
PETITIONER, WITHOUT TAKING EVIDENCE AND ENTERING 
FINDINGS TO SUPPORT AN ATTORNEYS FEES AWARD 18 
IV. IT WAS LEGAL ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO NOT RENDER 
A DECISION ON RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
Page 2 of 24 
JUDGMENT UNDER UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 60(b), 
AFTER JUDGMENT WAS ENTERED AGAINST THE RESPONDENT 
WHEN RESPONDENT'S ATTORNEY FAILED TO APPEAR IN THE 
COURTROOM AT THE TIME OF TRIAL 19 
CONCLUSION 20 
ADDENDUM 22 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, OR RULES 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Baker v. Western Surety Co. 757 P.2d. 878 (UT. App., 1988) 19 
Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp.. 717 P.2d 670, 675 (Utah 1985) 14 
Blue Skies Alliance v. Tex. Comm'n on Envtl. Quality. 265 
F.App'x 203, 207, 2008 WL 344750 (5th Cir.2008) 15 
Daines v. Vincent. 190P.3d 1269,1281 (Utah 2008) 14 
Leppert v. Leppert. 200 P.3d 223.227 (Utah App..2009) 16. 
Millerv.USAACas.Ins.Co..2002UT6438.44P.3d663 6,13,14,15,18. 
Pitt v. Taron. No. 200803 80-CA.^ [ 5 (May 7.2009) 14 
Watson v. Watson. 561 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1977) 18 
Wilde v. Wilde 969 P.2d 43 8 (Utah App.. 1998) 18 
Willey v. Willev. 951 P.2d226 (Utah. 1997) 18 
Page 3 of 24 
Constitutional Provisions and Statutes 
UtahConst.art.I,§ll 7,13,22 
Utah Const, art. I, §7 7,13,14,22 
Utah Code Annotated §30-3-3(1995) 18,22. 
Rules 
Rule 60(b) URCP 6,9,11,12,13,17,19,20,23 
Page 4 of 24 
The Respondent/Appellant Terryl Kevin Draney respectfully submits its brief on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this case pursuant to Sections 78A-4-
103(2) of the Utah Code Annotated, which provides that, "[t]he Court of Appeals has 
appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
...(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, 
but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, 
support, parent-time, visitation, adoption, and paternity;..." 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The folloAving issues require consideration by the Court as a result of the January 2nd, 
2009, FINDINGS; ORDER RE: PENDING MOTIONS; and JUDGMENT from the Fifth 
Judicial District Court, Washington County, Utah, by the Honorable James L. Shumate, Trial 
Court Judge. The ultimate legal question is whether the trial court acted properly by entering 
Judgment against the Respondent, when the Respondent's attorney failed to appear in the 
courtroom at the time of trial, and without giving the Respondent the decision as to whether 
the Respondent wanted to proceed without his attorney being present. Included within this 
review are the following issues: 
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1. Does the Open Courts provision of the Utah Constitution require that a 
Respondent be given an opportunity to be heard at a trial, even if the Respondent's Attorney 
is not present in the courtroom at trial? 
2. Does the Due Process provision of the Utah Constitution require that a 
Respondent be given an opportunity to be heard at a trial, even if the Respondent's Attorney 
is not present in the courtroom at trial? 
3. Is it an abuse of discretion for a trial court to render Judgment against a party 
at trial if the parties' attorney is not present in the courtroom? 
4. Is it an abuse of discretion for the trial court to enter an award of attorney's fees 
and costs, sua sponte, in favor of a party, when the other parties' attorney failed to appear at 
trial, without taking evidence and entering findings to support an attorneys fees award? 
5. Can a trial court render a decision on a Motion to Set Aside brought under Rule 
60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, after a Notice of Appeal is filed? 
Constitutional issues are questions of law reviewed under a correctness standard. See 
Gordon v. Maugham 204 P.3d 189, 191 (Utah App..2009¥citing Ostler v. Buhler. 1999 UT 
99, Tf 5, 989 P.2d 1073. The Utah Court of Appeals should review the trial court's decision 
to render judgment against the Respondent, without giving any deference to the trial court. 
See Id. When ensuring that litigants have received due process of law, courts resolve doubts 
in favor of permitting parties to have their day in court on the merits. Miller v. USAA Cas. 
Ins. Co. 44 P.3d 663, 674 (Utah,2002). Furthermore, the award of attorney fees is also a 
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matter of law, which the Court of Appeals should review for correctness. See Giusti v. 
Sterling Wentworth Corp. 201 P.3d 966 (Utah,2009)(citing Paul DeGroot Bids. Servs., 
L.L.C. v. Gallacher. 2005 UT 20, Tf 18, 112 P.3d 490). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. OR RULES 
Article I § 7 of the Utah Constitution 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. 
Article I § 11 of the Utah Constitution 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, 
property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered 
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or 
defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which 
he is a party. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a divorce proceeding held in the Fifth District Court, 
Washington County. The case was bifurcated and on December 11th, 2008, the trial court 
began a trial on the debts issue. After hours of testimony, Petitioner concluded her case in 
chief. At 11:04 am, on December 11,2008, the Respondent took the stand to begin his case 
in chief. Because the Respondent was suffering laryngitis, which interfered with the court's 
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ability to make an accurate record, the trial court continued the hearing until December 23, 
2008 at 9:00am. On December 23, 2008, a hearing was held to hear the balance of the 
December 11, 2008, hearing. Respondent was present in the courtroom when the case was 
called. However, neither one of Respondent's two attorneys of record were present in the 
courtroom when the case was called . One of Respondent's attorney's of record, Stephen 
Harris, was present in the courthouse halls when the case was called but was unaware that 
the case had been called and that he needed to fill in for the Respondent's other attorney of 
record that was to try the case for the Respondent. The other attorney of record, Matthew 
Harris, was in the court parking lot when the case was called, tending to a minor traffic 
accident that he was involved in, as he was parking his car outside the court. Mr. Matthew 
Harris entered the court at 9:08 but the trial court had already expeditiously granted all relief 
sought on behalf of Petitioner, without given the Respondent the opportunity to proceed 
without his attorney, or without notifying the Respondent's attorneys that the case had been 
called.. Petitioner's attorney was directed to prepare Orders to that effect along w/an affidavit 
of his attorney's fees. There was no motion for attorney's fees brought by the Petitioner, nor 
was evidence taken, or findings made, to support an attorneys fees award. However, the trial 
court awarded attorney's fees and cost sua sponte. On December 29,2008, Respondent filed 
a Verified Objection to Order and Judgment and Motion to Set Aside Ruling of December 
22, 2008. On January 02, 2009, Findings and Judgment were entered in the amount of $ 
30,5 54.10. On February4th, 2009, after both parties had an opportunity to brief Respondent's 
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Rule 60(b) Motion and the matter was submitted for decision, the trial court ruled that it was 
without jurisdiction to decide Respondent's Rule 60(b) Motion and refused to rule on 
Respondent's motion. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
The statement of facts is based upon the record of this case in the pleadings of the 
parties, including memorandum and supporting addenda in the lower court. 
1. The parties were married on July 29th, 1994. (R. at 164) 
2. During the time of the parties marriage, the parties acquired certain debts. (R. 
at 28-29). 
3. The Court bifurcated the Debts issue from the underlying divorce case and on 
December 11th. 2008, began a trial on the debts issues.( R. at 281-282). 
4. The Petitioner conducted her entire case-in-chief, of the debts issue, on 
December 11th, 2008, and rested. (R. at 281-282). 
5. On rebuttal, Respondent called himself as his first witness. (R. at 281-282) 
6. Due to Respondent's physical state at the time, suffering from laryngitis, he 
was unable to testify loud enough so as to allow the court to make an accurate record. (R. 
at 281-282) 
7. The Court continued the hearing for December 23, 2008. (R. at 281-282 ). 
8. On December 23rd, 2008, Respondent and his witnesses were in the courtroom 
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by 9:00 am.(R. at 283-284) 
9. Mr. Stephen K. Harris, one of Respondent's attorneys of record was in the 
courthouse, waiting for another hearing in the juvenile court, on an unrelated matter. (R. at 
287-298) 
10. Mr. Matthew L. Harris, Respondent's other attorneys of record, was in the 
court parking lot at 9:00 am, but was detained because of a fender bender accident he was 
involved in, in the courthouse parking lot. (R. at 287-298 ) 
11. Nobody notified Mr. Stephen Harris that his case had been called and his client 
was without an attorney.( R. at 287-298 ). 
12. Mr. Matthew Harris, who was prepared to present Respondent's case at trial, 
entered the court at 9:08 am. (R. at 287-298 ) 
13. By this time, the trial court had already rendered a decision in favor of the 
Petitioner. ( R. at 283-284 ) 
14. The trial court also awarded Petitioner her attorneys fees and costs, without 
even a request from the Petitioner. (R. at 283-284 ) 
15. With the Respondent being present in court and ready to proceed at trial, with 
the exception of his attorney not being present, the trial court never asked the Respondent if 
he wanted to proceed without his attorney. (R. at 283-284 ) 
16. Respondent was never permitted to present any of his rebuttal evidence at trial. 
(R. at 283-284) 
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17. On December 29th, 2009, the Respondent served a Motion to Set Aside the 
decision and judgment of the trial court, under UT R. Civ Pro 60(b), on the grounds that 
Respondent was never given an opportunity to be heard at the December 23rd, 2008, hearing, 
and that evidence if allowed to be presented would significantly reduce the amount the trial 
court would have allocated to the Respondent of the marital debts. (R. at 287-298 ). 
18. On January 16th, 2009, Petitioner served a response to Respondent's Rule 60(b) 
Motion. (R. at 312-323). 
19. On January 29th, 2009, the Respondent served a Reply Memorandum 
responding to Petitioner's Opposition to Respondent's Rule 60(b) Motion.( R. at 331-341). 
20. Also on Janurary 29th, 2009, the Respondent filed a Request to Submit for 
Decision on his Rule 60(b) Motion. (R. at 342-343 ). 
21. On February 4th, 2009, the trial court refused to rendered a decision on 
Respondent's Rule 60(b) motion, finding that as a Notice of Appeal had been filed by the 
Respondent on January 30th, 2009, and therefore the trial court lacked jurisdiction to decide 
Respondent's Rule 60(b0 motion. (R. at 346-347 ). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The lower court erred in rendering judgment against the Respondent on the debts issue 
at trial. The Utah Constitution affords all parties a "day in court" to litigate any justiciable 
controversy between them, and have the case properly adjudicated on the merits according 
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to the facts and the law. While Petitioner was an afforded her opportunity to present her facts 
at trial, Respondent never was afford the same opportunity because Respondent's attorney 
was not present in the courtroom, when the case was called. The trial court merely rendered 
judgment against the Respondent, without allowing Respondent to present his evidence. 
Furthermore, the trial court never inquired of the Respondent, as to whether he wanted to 
proceed in the absence of his attorney, nor notified the Respondent's counsel who was in the 
halls of the court that the case had been called. 
While the trial court is afforded considerable latitude in adjusting financial and 
property interests in a divorce case, and its actions are entitled to a presumption of validity, 
the Judgment of a trial court must still be overturned if there was such a serious inequity that 
has resulted to manifest a clear abuse of discretion. The trial court refusal to permit the 
Respondent from presenting his evidence that would have allowed the judge to render a 
different opinion, would be such an inequity to constitute an abuse of discretion. 
As to an award of attorneys fees, attorneys fees in a divorce case must be based on 
specific factors which the court must take evidence of and enter specific findings to support 
its attorneys fees award. The trial court never took evidence of the factors that must be 
considered, or made the required findings, to support such an award. Without the evidence 
and findings, the case should be remanded to the trial court to take evidence on these factors. 
Finally, it was legal error for the trial court to refuse to decide Respondent's URCP 
Rule 60(b) Motion. Under current law, the trial court retains jurisdiction to consider a Rule 
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60(b) Motion while an appeal is pending. The trial court's February 4th, 2009, decision to 
refuse to decide Respondent's Rule 60(b) motion was therefore in error. 
ARGUMENT 
L IT WAS A VIOLATION OF THE OPEN COURTS PROVISION AND 
THE DUE PROCESS PROVISION OF THE UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION TO 
RENDER JUDGMENT AGAINST THE RESPONDENT AT TRIAL, WITHOUT 
ALLOWING THE RESPONDENT AN OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT HIS CASE 
AND HIS DEFENSES. 
The lower court erred in entering Judgment against the Respondent, without allowing 
Respondent an opportunity to present his claims and defenses. Both the Open Courts 
provision, Utah Const, art. I, § 11, and the Due Process provision, Utah Const, art. I, § 7, of 
the Utah Constitution, have "been interpreted to guarantee that litigants will have their 'day 
in court.'"Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co.. 2002 UT 6, ^ 38, 44 P.3d 663. The Open Courts 
provision of the Utah Constitution provides that "[a]ll courts shall be open, and every person, 
for an injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due 
course of law, which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no 
person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by 
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party." UT Const. Art. I §11. 
Furthermore, the Due Process provision of the Utah Constitution provides that "No person 
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shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law."UT Const. Art. I §7. 
In Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co. 44 P.3d 663 (Utah,2002), the Utah Supreme Court 
interpreted these two constitutional provisions of the Utah Constitution to mean that 
"[p]arties to a suit, subject to all valid claims and defenses, are constitutionally entitled to 
litigate any justiciable controversy between them, i.e., they are entitled to their day in court." 
Furthermore, in Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp.. 717 P.2d 670, 675 (Utah 1985), the Utah 
Supreme Court stated that "[t]he clear language of the open courts provision guarantees 
access to the courts and a judicial procedure that is based on fairness and equality." 
Additionally, the Court in Miller noted that "[w]hen ensuring litigants have received due 
process of law, our policy is to 'resolve doubts in favor of permitting parties to have their day 
in court on the merits of a controversy.'"Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co. at 674. 
While the trial court, with its inherent powers as the authority in charge of the trial, 
has broad latitude to control and manage the proceedings and preserve the integrity of the 
trial process, this role still requires that such a process be carried out with fairness and 
thoroughness in administering justice. See Pitt v. Taron, No. 20080380-CA.^f 5 (May 7, 
2009). The Open Courts provision and the Due Process provision of the Utah Constitution 
requires that a party have his day in court. See Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co. at 673. For a 
party to have his day in court, the Utah Supreme Court has held that "each party shall be 
afforded the opportunity to present claims and defenses, and have them properly adjudicated 
on the merits according to the facts and the law." See Daines v. Vincent, 190P.3dl269,1281 
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(Utah 2008). Furthermore, the "merits of a case" has been defined as "the elements or 
grounds of a claim or defense." IcL cting Blue Skies Alliance v. Tex. Comm'n on Envtl. 
Quality. 265 F.App'x 203,207,2008 WL 344750 (5th Cir.2008). The Supreme Court further 
noted that "with regard to a judgment on the merits, we have clarified our standard by stating 
that ' a judgment on the merits may be made at any stage of the litigation, so long as the 
district court rendered judgment based upon a proper application of the relevant law to the 
facts of the case.'" Id at 1282 citing Miller. 2002 UT 6, % 42 n. 6, 44 P.3d 663. 
On the first morning of trial, held December 11th, 2008, Petitioner was afforded hours 
of the trial court's time to present her evidence to demonstrate her version of the facts 
pertaining to the debts of the parties. When the Respondent attempted to present his version 
of the facts at the December 11th, 2008, trial, the trial court found that the physical state of 
the Respondent would prevent the trial court from making a proper record of the proceeding 
and continued the trial until December 23rd, 2008, at 9:00 am. On the morning of December 
23rd, 2008, Respondent was in attendance and ready to proceed, when the case was called to 
present his version of the facts. However, Respondent's attorney was not present yet in the 
courtroom. The trial court never inquired of the Respondent, as to whether he wanted to 
proceed in the absence of his attorney. Furthermore, Respondent's attorney of record who 
was present in the courthouse halls that morning, but was not in the courtroom, was never 
notified that the case had been called, even though Petitioner's counsel looked right at Mr. 
Harris in the hall the morning of the trial, and knew that he was present in court that day. 
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Instead, based upon the absence of the Respondent's attorney, the trial court rendered 
judgment against the Respondent. Mr. Matthew Harris, Respondent's other attorney of record 
entered the court at 9:08 am and the case had already been called and judgment rendered 
against the Respondent. Because of the expeditious method in which the trial judge rendered 
judgment, the Respondent was never given an opportunity to present his facts so as to allow 
the trial judge to apply applicable law to the facts. Thus, the trial judge failed to render 
judgment on the merits and Respondent was never afford his day in court, according to the 
standards set forth by existing law. Therefore, such expeditious judgment by the trial court, 
violated the Open Courts provision and the Due Process provision of the Utah Constitution, 
and such judgment should be reversed and remanded. 
II. IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO ENTER 
JUDGMENT AGAINST THE RESPONDENT BECAUSE RESPONDENT'S 
ATTORNEY FAILED TO APPEAR IN THE COURTROOM FOR TRIAL. 
Although the trial court is afforded "considerable latitude in adjusting financial and 
property interests, and its actions are entitled to a presumption of validity, the Judgment of 
a trial court in a divorce action must still be overturned if there was a misunderstanding or 
misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial error, the evidence clearly 
preponderated against the findings, or such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a 
clear abuse of discretion." See Leppert v. Leppert 200 P.3d 223, 227 (Utah App.,2009). 
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Under this standard the January 2nd, 2009, Judgment should not stand. 
At the December 11th, 2008, trial, the Petitioner presented facts to support the 
judgment rendered. As an "exhibit" to the Petitioner's case, the Court admitted into evidence 
a summary of the Parties debts and any offsets that the Petitioner alleged were applicable to 
how the judgment should be offset. However, although there was evidence to support the trial 
judge's Findings and Judgment, it was still an abuse of discretion to not permit the 
Respondent to presenting his contrary evidence that most likely would have directed the trial 
court to render a different opinion. 
As set forth in Respondent's Rule 60(b) motion, Respondent had a Certified Public 
Account prepare a summary of the debts and offsets, which should have been considered by 
the trial court. Because the trial court entered judgment without affording the Respondent an 
opportunity to present his evidence at trial, because Respondent's attorney was not present 
in the courtroom, the trial court based its decision on only the evidence presented by the 
Petitioner. In so doing, it created a clear inequity against the Respondent. Respondent was 
not permitted to present his case on how the parties debts should be resolved and what offsets 
should be created to either party to come to a fair and equitable judgment. By not allowing 
Respondent to present his facts at trial, the trial court abused its discretion in entering 
judgment on only the facts presented by the Petitioner and the decision should be reversed 
and remanded. 
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III. IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO SUA 
SPONTE AWARD ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS TO THE PETITIONER, 
WITHOUT TAKING EVIDENCE AND ENTERING FINDINGS TO SUPPORT AN 
ATTORNEYS FEES AWARD 
"Under Utah law, attorney fees are generally not recoverable 'unless authorized by 
statute or contract..'" Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co. at 680. Utah Code Annotated §30-3-3 
gives a basis for an award of attorneys fees in a domestic action. See UCA 30-3-3 (1995). 
However, while an award of attorney fees in a divorce cases rests within the sound discretion 
of the trial court, "such an award must be based on the 'reasonableness of the requested fees, 
as well as the financial need of the receiving spouse, and the ability of the other spouse to 
pay.'" Wilde v. Wilde 969 P.2d 438 (Utah App.,1998). The Utah Supreme Court in Willev 
v. Willev, 951 P.2d 226 (Utah, 1997), held that "the trial court in exercising its discretion 
must make the findings of fact explicit in support of its legal conclusions.... If the appellate 
court determines that the findings of fact are insufficient to support the conclusion, the 
appellate court normally remands the matter to the trial court for further proceedings." Id at 
230 (citing Watson v. Watson, 561 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1977). 
At neither the December 11th, 2008, nor the December 23rd, 2008, trial did the trial 
court take any evidence of the Petitioner's financial need or the Respondent's ability to pay 
attorney's fees. Furthermore, there was never any inquiry made by the trial court about the 
fees charged by the Petitioner's attorney, Mr. Caldwell. Furthermore, the January 2nd, 2009, 
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Judgment fails to cite any findings made that would support the award of attorney's fees to 
the Petitioner. Without findings to support the award of attorneys fees, the judgment of the 
trial court awarding the Petitioner fees should be reversed an remanded. 
IV. IT WAS LEGAL ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO NOT RENDER A 
DECISION ON RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT UNDER 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 60(b), AFTER JUDGMENT WAS 
ENTERED AGAINST THE RESPONDENT WHEN RESPONDENT'S ATTORNEY 
FAILED TO APPEAR IN THE COURTROOM AT THE TIME OF TRIAL 
In Baker v. Western Surety Co. 757 P.2d. 878 (UT. App., 1988), the Utah Court of 
Appeals adopted the view of certain Federal Circuits and state courts that took the position 
"that the trial court has jurisdiction to consider a Rule 60(b) Motion while an appeal is 
pending." See Id at 880. According to the Baker decision, "the Rule 60(b) Motion may be 
filed and considered by the trial court without leave from the appellate court and the trial 
court may deny the motion without permission of the appellate court. However, if the district 
court is inclined to grant the motion, the movant must obtain an order of remand from the 
court before an appropriate order or judgment is actually entered." Id. 
On January 2nd, 2009 the Court entered Judgment against the Respondent, for which 
this appeal was taken. Respondent brought a Rule 60(b) Motion, under the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, to set aside said Judgment. Both Parties had an opportunity to brief 
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Respondent's Motion. The Motion was subsequently submitted for decision, on January 29th, 
2009. On February 4th, 2009, the trial court refused to rendered a decision on Respondent's 
Rule 60(b) motion, finding that as a Notice of Appeal had been filed by the Respondent on 
January 30th, 2009, and therefore the trial court lacked jurisdiction to decide Respondent's 
Rule 60(b0 motion. However, the trial courts basis for refusing to render a decision on 
Respondent's Rule 60(b) motion is incorrect as a matter of law. Under the above cited 
precedent, the trial court has jurisdiction to render a decision and Respondent's Rules 60(b) 
motion, and such motion should have been decided. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should reverse the Fifth Judicial District Court's 
January 2nd, 2009, Findings; Order Re: Pending Motions; and Judgment and remand the case 
to the trial court to rehear the issues at a proper trial. 
DATED this 21st day of May, 2009. HARRIS & HARRIS LAWYERS, LLC. 
Matthew L. Harris, Attorney for Appellant/ 
Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that on this 21st day of May 2009,1 caused to be mailed by first class 
US mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF THE 
APPELLANT/RESPONDENT to each of the following at the addresses set forth herein: 
N. Adam Caldwell 
Lewis P. Reece 
SNOW JENSEN & REECE 
912 West 1600 South, Suite 200 
St. George, UT 84770 
Legal Assistant 
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ADDENDUM 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, OR RULES 
Article I § 7 of the Utah Constitution 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. 
Article I § 11 of the Utah Constitution 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, 
property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered 
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or 
defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which 
he is a party. 
Utah Code Annotated §30-3-3(1995) 
(1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3, Divorce, Chapter 4, Separate 
Maintenance, or Title 78B, Chapter 7, Part 1, Cohabitant Abuse Act, and in any action to 
establish an order of custody, parent-time, child support, alimony, or division of property in 
a domestic case, the court may order a party to pay the costs, attorney fees, and witness fees, 
including expert witness fees, of the other party to enable the other party to prosecute or 
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defend the action. The order may include provision for costs of the action. 
(2) In any action to enforce an order of custody, parent-time, child support, alimony, 
or division of property in a domestic case, the court may award costs and attorney fees upon 
determining that the party substantially prevailed upon the claim or defense. The court, in its 
discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a party if the court finds the party is 
impecunious or enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees. 
(3) In any action listed in Subsection (1), the court may order a party to provide 
money, during the pendency of the action, for the separate support and maintenance of the 
other party and of any children in the custody of the other party. 
(4) Orders entered under this section prior to entry of the final order or judgment may 
be amended during the course of the action or in the final order or judgment. 
Rule 60(b) URCP 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the 
record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court 
at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if any, 
as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected 
before the appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is 
pending may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. 
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On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve 
a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the 
following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly 
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move 
for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or 
extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is 
void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon 
which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the 
judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from 
the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for 
reasons (1), (2), or (3),not more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was 
entered or taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a 
judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain 
an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside 
a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment 
shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action. 
Page 24 of 24 
